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a b s t r a c t
In light of the signiﬁcant changes being observed in the US space industry, in terms of the increase share
of commercial launches, the development of inland spaceports, and the emergence of new vehicle
designs and propulsion systems, there is need to reassess launch safety. In this paper, several issues
related to space launch safety are reviewed, one in particular being the use, as the main the safety metric,
of the mean collective risk to the general public, also known as the expectation of casualties. A new, decision level, information-fusion-based metric is proposed, and through a detailed case study, its merit in
terms of the quality and quantity of information it generates is illustrated. The need for a new metric
is here advocated as a critical ﬁrst step toward the necessary transition from a risk avoidance philosophy
to space launch safety to a risk management philosophy.
Ó 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction
The 50 year old US space industry is undergoing signiﬁcant
changes on a number of fronts. First, its activities are now increasingly being driven by commercial launches rather than federal government launches. Second, the growing interest from some federal
states in owning spaceports is opening a new era with the future
development of inland launch sites. This is a signiﬁcant departure
from federal spaceports – such as Kennedy Space Center (KSC) in
Florida (known as the Eastern Range, ER), Vandenberg Air Force
Base in California (known as the Western Range, WR) or Wallops
Flight Facility in Wallops Island, Virginia – which are located on
coastal areas with launch routes over the oceans, thereby limiting
over land ﬂights. Third, the designs of new expandable and reusable launch vehicles (ELVs and RLVs) from private manufacturers
on one hand, and ongoing advances in new propulsion technologies [1] on the other, are calling for new launch systems certiﬁcation procedures. Indeed, the signiﬁcant activities from federal
states and the private sector have led the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to open the Ofﬁce of Commercial Space Transportation as a regulatory agency [2].
However, from a safety standpoint, the loss of two of the ﬁve
Space Shuttles during both the launch and the return phases of
ﬂights has raised public awareness on the safety issues related to
space launches. In addition, the launch safety standard procedures,
and the launch risk metric currently in use, as dictated and deﬁned
* Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 407 823 2204; fax: +1 407 823 3413.
E-mail address: serge@mail.ucf.edu (S.N. Sala-Diakanda).
1566-2535/$ - see front matter Ó 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.inffus.2009.10.003

by the Eastern and Western (EWR) 127-1 safety standard document [3], are increasingly being criticized for their complexity
and philosophy. In fact, they promote a risk avoidance rather than
a risk management philosophy to safety [4]. In light of future inland spaceports, where ﬂight over populated areas cannot be
avoided, such risk avoidance approach may potentially drive space
launch operation costs even higher, precisely at a time when reduced costs are actively sought after. Therefore, as a major component of total launch cost, and being the obvious factor in public
safety, there is an urgent need to rethink launch safety in general,
in a way that would render space launches less cost-prohibitive,
while at the same time maintain current public safety levels.
Rethinking launch safety involves many areas, one of which
being the quality of the metric being used to assess it. In this paper,
we ﬁrst provide a brief description of the EWR 127-1, including the
expectation of casualties EC –also known as the mean collective
risk – its main safety metric, and review the literature on outstanding issues related to this document. The inadequacy of EC is then
fully exposed, justifying the need for a different safety metric for
space launch risk analysis. An information-fusion based safety
metric is then proposed. The value of this new metric, and how it
is calculated, is then illustrated through a detailed case study simulating the launch of a Space Shuttle from an inland spaceport. The
belief is that the form of this metric, while being more informative,
is also more intuitive than EC, thereby facilitating communication
of launch risk to chief safety ofﬁcers, launch managers and, ultimately, the general public. The authors hope that this paper on
an improved method of estimating the rocket launch mission risk,
could be of interest to different groups of professionals such as the
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mission safety specialists, the launcher agencies, the data processing specialists, the launch risk policy analysts and the top management decision makers for launches.
1.1. Background on the EWR 127-1 document and the mean
collective risk
The EWR 127-1 is a large, seven chapters, detailed document
developed by the 45th Space Wing (Cape Canaveral Air Station,
FL) and the 30th Space Wing (Vandenberg Air Force Base, CA). It
is intended to provide users of the ER and the WR (from this point
referred to as the ranges) with a common set of system, ﬂight and
ground safety requirements. The steps by steps requirements seek
to minimize risks of loss of mission and of property damage, and
prevent the personnel and public from being exposed to risks greater than those considered acceptable by public law and state documents [3]. The full document can be accessed here [5].
The main safety metric used by the ranges is the mean collective
risk to the general public, also known as the expectation of casualties EC. The EWR 127-1 dictates that this value should be less than
30  106. In other words, at most one serious injury or fatality (a
casualty) should be expected every 33,000 launches. For a launch
rate of 33 per year, this threshold can be interpreted as expecting
1 casualty every 1000 years. Both ranges have outstanding safety
records, as no member of the general public or the launch site workforce has ever been killed as a result of a launch from these sites.
However, in the year 2000, a study completed by the committee
on Space Launch Range Safety [4], at the request of the Air Force
Space Command, identiﬁed signiﬁcant issues with the EWR 1271, two of which are mentioned here. The ﬁrst relates to how a
range user should achieve the threshold EC requirement. The committee observed that the EWR 127-1 is focused more on methods
and solutions than on basic, performance-based safety requirements [4]. To paraphrase, the study indicates that although the
EWR 127-1 sets a safety threshold, no allowable component- or
system-level risk assessment is provided. This has led to the de facto guiding principle of ‘‘achieve the highest system reliability”. The
second issue relates to the poor usability of the EWR 127-1. The
severity of this issue is to the point that essentially a new version
of this document is generated for each new launch system, a phenomenon known as tailoring. The committee pointed that such
practices led to potential inconsistencies, leading among others
to different certiﬁcation costs between users for identical equipments [4].
2. Hazard modeling and issues with mean collective risk
The mean collective risk is calculated by estimating the effect of
one or all of the three main hazards produced by all launch vehicles
currently in service. During a vehicle breakup – whether accidental
or instructed by a safety ofﬁcer – a large amount of fragments is
generated. The vehicle may also release, depending on the phase
of ﬂight, a large amount of toxicant from its propellant. This release
may be in the form of burning propellant fragments that continue
to burn upon reaching the ground [6]. The overpressures from
explosion blasts constitute the third hazard. Blasts may be the
source of the vehicle breakup and/or may be produced from the
impact of the burning propellant fragments mentioned above with
the ground. In addition to those hazards’ effects, calculations of the
mean collective risk involve estimation of the probability of failure
of the vehicle as a function of the phase of ﬂight, and estimation of
the geographic distribution and sheltering of the public. The general formulation for the expectation of casualties (for any given
hazard) is as follows:

EC ¼ EPH  P C=E  PE

ð1Þ

where EC is the expected casualties, EPH is the expected population
hazarded (or the number of people expected to be casualties), PC/E is
the probability of having a casualty following the breakup of a vehicle, and PE is the probability that the breakup will occur. Expectedly,
the computation of EC is very complex.
2.1. The problematic of estimating the mean collective risk
Detailed speciﬁcation of the vehicle failure modes and their
associated probabilities of failures are problematic given, on one
hand, the absence of a large amount of historical data, and on
the other the sheer complexity of launch systems. Fault trees of
NASA’s Space Shuttle [7,8] and detailed information on US launch
systems reliability over the past 50 years [9] can be found in the
literature.
Modeling of public exposure is also a complex task. Factors such
as population demographics and geographical distributions, or levels of sheltering are all important in assessing the degree of exposure. Pubic exposure is speciﬁc to the hazard being considered.
Tools that are developed to model exposure to debris [10] are not
suitable for assessing exposure to toxic gases or to explosions blasts.
In addition, when it comes to the hazards themselves, the modeling
and analyses techniques aimed at estimating their spatio-temporal
impact footprints are generally conservative because of the great
amount of uncertainties surrounding most of the contributing variables [4], such as fragments’ ballistic characteristics, winds
strengths and directions, and other meteorological conditions.
2.2. Merit of the mean collective risk as a safety metric
From the discussion above, it results from current practices that
the best estimate of the mean collective risk can only be surrounded with a great amount of uncertainty, thereby severely
impacting its value as a safety metric. Indeed, some [11] have stated that a conﬁdent decision on the course of actions to be taken
(launch, abort, destruct, etc.) can only be made if the computed risk
is well above or below the safety threshold, in such a way that the
uncertainty associated with it will have no impact on the decision.
The value of EC as a safety metric is undermined further in the presence of more than one hazard. For ELVs, this may occur for breakups early in the launch phase, while some RLVs may generate these
hazards at any phase of their ﬂights. In such cases, the overall collective risk as speciﬁed in the EWR 127-1 is the sum of the individual risks [12]. In other words, the assumption being made is that
the overall risk is an independent combination of the individual
risks generated by each hazard. Given that the non-congruent impact areas of the three hazards will often have some degree of
overlap, an independent combination of their risks could result
in an individual being counted more than once as a casualty. This
is clearly a very conservative approach, one that reﬂects the risk
avoidance philosophy of the EWR 127-1, and handicaps the growth
of the US space industry, as it overly restricts operations.
3. Formulation of a fusion based safety metric
Of the issues related to the value of EC as described above, information fusion theory may be used to address the problematic of
the uncertainty surrounding the mean, and the assumption of
independence. The logic we propose follows. Concerning the
uncertainty surrounding the mean, instead of focusing on a mean
value whose uncertainty may be overly inﬂated by the assumption
of independence, we suggest that the focus be on building a conﬁdence around the probability of exceeding a predetermined safety
threshold. Indeed, truly what should be of interest from a safety
standpoint is the risk of exceeding a threshold. If the true value
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of this risk can be captured with some conﬁdence, then a more informed decision on the actions to be taken can be made. On the
other hand, since the true nature of the interdependencies between the hazards’ effects cannot be fully speciﬁed, a better
assumption than independence is ‘‘no assumption at all”. The metric proposed is an envelope with bounds MinRISK and MaxRISK,
respectively the minimum and maximum probabilities of a fused
expectation of casualties exceeding the safety threshold. Therefore,

MinRISK ¼ min probðECFUS P ECTRESH Þ
MaxRISK ¼ max probðECFUS P ECTRESH Þ

ð2Þ

where ECTRESH is a safety threshold, ECFUS is the fused expectation of
casualties of the three hazards identiﬁed earlier (when no assumption is made on the nature of the interdependencies).
Therefore, from a decision maker perspective, with this metric,
the decision to be taken is shifted from being based upon a subjective assessment of the size of the uncertainty around the mean to
being based upon a range of probabilities of exceeding a pre-speciﬁed safety threshold. To illustrate, suppose ECTRESH = 3 for a particular launch, indicating that the launch will be aborted if the
expected number of casualties is greater or equal to 3. Then our
metric, which combine the effect of all the hazards, may generate
an estimate of the form

MinRISK ¼ min probðECFUS P 3Þ ¼ 25%
MaxRISK ¼ max probðECFUS P 3Þ ¼ 67%

ð3Þ

The decision maker will then have to decide whether this risk is
acceptable. With current practices, such clear measures cannot be
obtained.
3.1. Methodology
Over the past two decades, interest in information fusion – also
known as multi-source data fusion – has grown tremendously. It is
widely used in various US Department of Defense (DoD) research
areas such as automated target recognition, battleﬁeld surveillance, and guidance and control of autonomous vehicles. However,
it is being used increasingly in other, non-DoD applications. Hall
and Llinas [13] deﬁne data fusion as ‘‘. . .a formal framework in
which are expressed means and tools for the alliance of data originating from different sources, with the aim of obtaining information of greater quality. . .”. In the context of range safety, the greater
quality may refer to the complete (all hazards being considered),
more realistic (no assumption of independence) and more useful
(a calculated range of risk) nature of the safety metric proposed
here. The data originating from different sources are the expectation of casualties (the data) as estimated independently by each
hazard (the sources).
Several information fusion frameworks have been developed
and can be found in the literature. Established ones include, among
others, Bayesian Inference [14], Dempster-Shafer theory [15], Distributed Envelope Determination (DEnv) [16] and the Transferable
Belief Model [17]. We will discuss here Distributed Envelope
Determination, and how it can be used to estimate the metric
being proposed. It is worth noting that Dempster-Shafer theory1
could be have been used as well [18]. However, we believe DEnv
to be more intuitive and therefore more effective in illustrating the
proposition being made.
3.1.1. Implementation of DEnv
DEnv is a convolution-based method for determining dependency bounds of binary arithmetic operations on random variables
1

Bayesian Inference requires a full speciﬁcation of the joint probability between
the different sources, rendering it impractical for this application.
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(RVs), even when their corresponding cumulative distribution
functions (cdfs) may be uncertain. This is in contrast to Monte Carlo simulation which assumes that the distributions of the random
variables are known. Furthermore, in cases where the dependency
relationship between the RVs is not speciﬁed, DEnv can produce
bounds which include the entire range of possible dependencies.
To implement this method through decision fusion, we treat the
expectation of casualties generated by the hazard models as RVs.
We therefore deﬁne ECB, ECD and ECG as the expectations of casualties’ random variables generated respectively from blast propagation, debris fragmentation and gas dispersion. Empirical
distributions of the RVs mentioned above (ECB, ECD, and ECG) can
be generated by simulating different vehicle breakup scenarios,
as illustrated in Section 4. The distributions are then used as inputs
to DEnv, and fused as explained below.
Suppose ECFUS = ECi + ECj where ECi and ECj are RVs – corresponding to the effects of two known hazards – following two empirical
distributions. These distributions can be represented in a ‘‘joint
distribution tableau” in order to (1) determine (if the 2 RVs are
considered independent of each other) or (2) bound (if the 2 RVs
are dependent of each other) their joint distribution (i.e. ECFUS).
Using interval-based arithmetic,2 a ‘‘joint distribution tableau”
can conveniently display the relationship between a joint distribution and its associated marginals (Table 1). If ECi and ECj are independent, then the joint probabilities are obtained by multiplying
the marginals (e.g. p11 = pj1  pi1). However, if ECi and ECj are dependent, and the nature of that dependency is unknown, then the joint
probabilities cannot be determined. In such case, DEnv makes an
inference about the joint distribution by identifying the possible
range of the joint probabilities. In other words, for every value of
the random variable ECFUS, the interest is in ﬁnding the minimum
and maximum cumulative probabilities possible. For example, given Table 1, if we are interested in eCFUS 6 0.057, then3 only the
cells in bold should be considered.
Among those cells, the maximum cumulative probability at
0.057 can be found by maximizing the sum of the probabilities of
the cells in which eCFUS 6 0.057 may occur. On the other hand,
the minimum cumulative probability at 0.057 is found by minimizing the sum of the probabilities of the cells in which eCFUS 6 0.057
must occur. As Table 1 imposes the following constraints, Row conP3
straints:
for a = 1–3, Column constraints:
b¼1 pab ¼ paj
P3
a¼1 pab ¼ pib for b = 1–3, ﬁnding the maximum and minimum
cumulative probabilities for eCFUS 6 0.057 becomes equivalent to
solving a set of two optimization questions, which can be done
through linear programming (LP):

Maximize ðp11 þ p21 þ p31 þ p12 þ p22 þ p32 Þ
subject to
3
P
pab ¼ paj

for a ¼ 1—3

b¼1
3
P

pab ¼ pib

ð4:aÞ

for b ¼ 1—3

a¼1

pij P 0
Minimize ðp11 þ p12 Þ
subject to
3
P
pab ¼ paj

for a ¼ 1—3

b¼1
3
P

pab ¼ pib

ð4:bÞ

for b ¼ 1—3

a¼1

pij P 0
2
In interval analysis, if Z = X + Y where X is the interval [i, j] and Y the interval [k, l],
then Z is the interval [i + k, j + l].
3
eCFUS is a sample value of the random variable ECFUS.
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Table 1
Joint distribution tableau of ECFUS = ECi + ECj with cells contributing to the objective function identiﬁed.
Intervals and associated probabilities
ECFUS e [0.021, 0.055] p11 = ?
ECFUS e [0.031, 0.065] p21 = ?
ECFUS e [i1 + k3, j1 + l3] p31 = ?
ECi e [i1, j1] pi1 = 0.25

ECi

ECj
ECFUS e [0.025, 0.057] p12 = ?
ECFUS e [0.035, 0.067] p22=?
ECFUS e [0.065, 0.127] p32 = ?
ECi e [i2, j2] pi2 = 0.5

ECFUS e [0.027, 0.06] p13 = ?
ECFUS e [0.037, 0.07] p23 = ?
ECFUS e [0.067, 0.13] p33 = ?
ECi e [i3, j3] pi3 = 0.25

ECj e [0.03, 0.06] p1j = 0.3
ECj e [0.06, 0.12] p2j = 0.2
ECj e [0.03, 0.06] p3j = 0.3

Table 2
Transportation tableau for maximum cumulative probability at eCFUS 6 0.057. Cells where this condition may occur are assigned a cost of 1.
Source

Destination

ECj e [0.02, 0.05]
ECj e [0.03, 0.06]
ECj e [.06, 0.12]
Demand

Supply

ECi e [0.001, 0.005]

ECi e [0.005, 0.007]

ECi e [0.007, 0.01]

ECFUS e [0.021, 0.055] p11 = ? C11 = 1
ECFUS e [0.031, 0.065] p21 = ? C21 = 1
ECFUS e [i1 + k3, j1 + l3] p31 = ? C31 = 0
0.25

ECFUS e [0.025, 0.057] p12 = ? C12 = 1
ECFUS e [0.035, 0.067] p22 = ? C22 = 1
ECFUS e [0.065, 0.127] p32 = ? C32 = 0
0.5

ECFUS e [0.027, 0.06] p13 = ? C13 = 1
ECFUS e [0.037, 0.07] p23 = ? C23 = 1
ECFUS e [0.067, 0.13] p33 = ? C33 = 0
0.25

Therefore, for each value of ECFUS, two LP problems must be
solved. Connecting all the cumulative probabilities produces a maximum and a minimum curve within which all the possible cumulative distribution functions of ECFUS must belong. DEnv’s approach
solves the two LP problems through the transportation simplex
method (TSM). However, since TSM requires transportation tableaus, joint distribution tables such as Table 1 must be transformed.
This is accomplished by treating the marginals ECi and ECj as destinations and sources respectively, and setting both the total supply
and the total demand equal to 1. Also, since the objective of the TSM
is to minimize the objective function, a goal of maximization (as in
Eq. (4.a)), must be transformed into one of minimization (Eq. (5)).
This is achieved by setting the costs Cab’s of the cells contributing
to the objective function to 1. Table 2 is the resulting transportation tableau. On the other hand, when the objective is to minimize,
(as in Eq. (4.b)), the Cab’s are set to 1 in those cells in which the event
eCFUS 6 0.057 must occur (C11 and C12 in Table 2). In both cases, the
costs of non-contributing cells are set to 0.

Minimize ðp11  p21  p31  p12  p22  p32 Þ
subject to
3
P
pab ¼ paj

for a ¼ 1—3

b¼1
3
P

ð5Þ
pab ¼ pib

for b ¼ 1—3

a¼1

0.5
0.3
0.2
1

are (1) selecting and modeling a geographical area of interest, (2)
constructing sheltering and exposure models for that area, (3) simulating vehicle breakups at several state vectors, (4) calculating
hazard-speciﬁc expectation of casualties from the spatial distributions of the hazards generated, (5) fusing those expectations, and
(6) mapping the fused outputs to geographic locations (for example as high, medium or low risk areas).
The fused outputs may then be represented as map layers on a
geographical information system (GIS) system. Of the six steps
mentioned above, steps 1, and 3–6 are the most important to illustrate the merit of the new metric and fusion scheme being proposed over current practices. Therefore, sheltering and exposure
data was not considered.
4.1. Spaceport site selection
The spaceport site was selected to reﬂect the growing interest,
mentioned earlier, from some inland federal states in owning a
spaceport. Understanding the implications of locating a spaceport
inland is of critical importance since, from a risk estimation standpoint, a vehicle breaking over land may generate a larger risk to the
public than a vehicle breaking over the oceans. For our simulation,
we selected Clinton-Sherman Spaceport of Oklahoma (35.34N,
99.20E) located in Northwest Washita Census County Division
(CCD). Clinton-Sherman Spaceport has been licensed by the FAA
as a space tourism launch site since June 2006 [19].

C 11 ¼ C 21 ¼ C 31 ¼ C 12 ¼ C 22 ¼ C 32 ¼ 1
other C ab ¼ 0;

pij P 0

In order to generate the maximum and minimum cdf curves, one
must know, for each point eCFUS on the domain of ECFUS, the highest
and lowest cumulative probabilities (the extremes) that are possible for any dependency relationship between the data sources ECi
and ECj. Since the extremes have staircase shapes, one only needs
to select the eCFUS at which discontinuities occur. It can be shown
[16] that the discontinuities only occur at the endpoints of the
intervals eCFUSij of ECFUS. Given those facts, the number of candidate
points eCFUS (and therefore, the number of LP problems needed to be
solved) can be signiﬁcantly reduced. Fig. 1 illustrates the metric
being proposed, once the two cdf curves have been determined.

4.2. Modeling of the complex terrain
An important factor, particularly in the dispersion of toxic gases,
is the complexity of the terrain. AERMAP [20], the terrain preprocessor system from the US Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), was used to model the complex terrain around Clinton-Sherman Spaceport. AERMAP processes commercially available digital

4. Experimental investigation: modeling range safety for an
inland spaceport
Simulating (and analyzing the effects of) launch vehicles’ breakups may be performed using the routine shown in Fig. 2. The steps

Fig. 1. Curves bounding the true cdf of the fused output ECFUS.
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area and domain of study (Fig. 3) were designed to cover Clinton-Sherman Spaceport and a large area around the vehicle launch
trajectory, so as to accommodate the potentially large hazard impact areas, given the weather conditions at the time of launch.
4.3. Simulation of vehicle breakup

Fig. 2. Launch vehicle breakup simulation routine.

elevation data from the United States Geological Survey (USGS)
and other commercial sites to produce terrain elevation data ﬁles.
A total of 128, 7.5-min digital elevation model (DEM) ﬁles were
processed, covering an area of approximately 200 km (in the
east–west direction) by 95 km (in the north–south direction). Since
AERMAP also requires a modeling domain inside the area covered
by the DEM ﬁles, we deﬁned – in UTM-14N coordinates – a domain
with the southwest corner at 470,000E and 3,895,000N, and the
northeast corner of the domain at 660,000E and 3,965,000N. The

NASA’s Space Shuttle was selected as the launch vehicle for this
study. Although Clinton-Sherman Spaceport may never be used for
launching vehicles of this size, the Space Shuttle was selected for
the availability of historical data. Using data from three Space
Shuttle missions – STS-114, STS-115 and STS-121 – high-order
polynomial equations for the vehicle altitude, downrange, velocity
magnitude and direction as functions of time were derived using
commercial statistical software. These equations were then used
to simulate 89 different breakups scenarios, spanning from time
t = +0 s (breakup on the launch pad) to time t = +130 s (breakup
at boosters’ separation). In order to eliminate the effect of the probability of occurrence of each breakup on the comparative analysis
between the risk estimates generated with the proposed approach,
and those generated with current practices, all the simulated
breakups were assigned the same probability of occurrence. For
each breakup, the following parameters were monitored: Vehicle
altitude and downrange, vehicle speed and direction, vehicle
weight, amount of solid propellant remaining, and amount of
liquid propellant remaining.
Along with meteorological data, such as wind direction and
speed, the parameters above were used to simulate pieces of debris
trajectories, blast wave propagation, and toxic gases dispersion.
Meteorological data were collected from the Will Rogers World Airport station in Oklahoma City (station #13967), located at latitude
35.389N and longitude 97.600W [21]. The data was collected for
the year 1989, at the time the latest available dataset for hourly data
in the area. The meteorological wind data was processed through
AERMET, a processor used by the EPA and the launches were simulated to occur on March 15 at 10:00 AM in the morning, local time.
The fragmentation process and the estimation of debris trajectories were performed according to similar modeling practices as
described in the literature [22]. Blast wave propagation analysis
was carried using the TNT equivalency method [23]. Modeling of
toxic gases dispersion was performed in AERMOD, an EPA-recommended state-of-the-art dispersion model for determining compliance with National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS). In
addition, the gas dispersion modeling followed NASA recommended procedure as published here [24]. Table 3 lists some of
the critical parameters used and assumptions made in the modeling effort of hazards’ effect.

Fig. 3. CCD terrain elevations around Clinton-Sherman spaceport (Displayed in ArcMap).
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Table 3
Parameters and assumptions of hazards’ effect modeling.
Parameters

Value

 Initial vehicle trajectory and state
vectors
 Debris generated at breakup
 Groups of debris with similar ballistic
characteristics
 Wind effect on debris trajectory

 From historical data

 Uncertainties considered in debris
trajectory

 Uncertainty not considered in debris
trajectory
 Gas dispersion
 Toxicant modeled
 Average concentration
 Toxicant 4-h time average
concentration threshold value
 Blast overpressure thresholdc

 80,000a
 100
 Once debris has reached
terminal velocity [24]
 Real time state vector
uncertainty
 Fragment initial velocity
uncertainty
 Drag uncertainty
 Lift uncertainty
 Wind uncertainty
 Tumble turn malfunctionsb





25,000 receptors
Hydrochloric acid (HCl)
4-h time average
5 ppm (7.46 mg/m3)

 10 kPa

Considered only cases where the debris ﬁelds produced by the solid rocket booster
(SRBs) signiﬁcantly overlap each other.
Percentage of all the fragments produced which are also burning propellant was
assumed to be proportional to the volume of the two SRBs with respect to the
complete Space Shuttle vehicle (orbiter, external tank and the 2 SRBs).
a
Similar to Space Shuttle Columbia breakup estimates [24].
b
This uncertainty requires extensive and detailed information that could not be
obtained for the vehicle being modeled.
c
Corresponds to an approximate scaled distance of 9 m/kg1/3. This overpressure
is the approximate value at which eardrum rupture – the ﬁrst type of damage to an
individual – occurs.

4.4. Calculating hazard-speciﬁc expectation of casualties
In order to estimate the risk generated by each hazard, population distribution data is needed. LandScanTM 2005 dataset
[26], a worldwide population database developed by Oak Ridge
National Laboratory (ORNL) can be used to provide this data. It
is a population database compiled on a 3000  3000 latitude/longitude grid which includes, for each country, the best available
census counts at sub-national levels. For each hazard, a map is
developed to construct an empirical distribution of the expected
number of casualties, given the simulated launch trajectory. Each
map is made of three layers: (1) a layer for the CCDs around
Clinton-Sherman Spaceport, (2) a layer for population count
and geographical distribution in each CCD, and (3) a layer representing the spatial distribution of the hazards features (debris
ﬁelds, gas clouds where the concentration threshold has been
exceeded and, blast waves where the overpressure threshold
has been exceeded).
Fig. 4 shows the map developed for the debris dispersion
analysis. Debris ﬁelds are the largest – sometimes spanning several CCDs – for breakups occurring later in ﬂight, at higher altitudes. It can also be seen, through the overlapping ﬁelds of all
breakup scenarios that some CCDs are more likely to be severely
impacted than others. Merging together, for a speciﬁc hazard, all
the areas considered at risk results in a map such as Fig. 5. Fig. 5
provides a close-up around Clinton-Sherman, showing three
non-congruent hazards’ areas for a Space Shuttle launch under
the ﬂight and meteorological conditions mentioned in Section
4.3.
Gas, as opposed to debris, is dominant in early breakups,
when vehicles have large amount of propellant remaining. On
the other hand, high overpressure blasts only occur very early

in the launch phase,4 as indicated by the non-concentric blast
waves on the map. Therefore, in light of the spatio-temporal nature of the estimated areas at risk, one should not only be interested in an estimate of the overall risk (risk of a ﬂight), but also
in assessing how this risk may be distributed among the geographic entities (risk in each CCD). This latter assessment is
needed in two critical areas: (1) the evaluation of the suitability
of a spaceport location, and (2) the planning and design of risk
mitigation procedures.

5. Results and discussion
5.1. Assessing the overall risk
Since blast waves and toxic gases are continuous features, the
reasonable assumption was made that anyone inside their impact
areas will be considered a casualty. The estimated probability distributions of expected casualties for the gas and blast are shown
in Table 4. On the other hand, the pieces of debris being discrete features, it is unreasonable to assume that everyone inside a given
debris area – a person exposed – is automatically a casualty (after
the Space Shuttle Columbia breakup, although more than 80,000
pieces of debris fell over more than 10 counties, resulting in a large
number of people exposed, there was no casualty reported [25]). Instead, the number of casualties due to debris was determined by
treating the probability of being a casualty as an outcome of a Bernoulli trial. Two inputs necessary for the implementation of this approach were the distribution of the areas of the debris ﬁelds and the
frequency distribution of the number of people exposed in them.
These inputs were determined from data contained in Fig. 4.
The new metric requires the outputs of the Tables 4 and 5 to be
fused. It also focuses on the probability of exceeding (or not
exceeding) an expectation of casualty threshold – which needs to
be set – rather than on a mean expected value. Table 6 shows
the risk of incurring at least and at most 5 casualties. The estimates
of each hazard and of their combination under the assumption of
independence are also listed. For these last cases, the probabilities
(for ‘‘at least” and ‘‘at most”) are simply the complements of each
other. However, this is not the case with the proposed metric (fusion upper and lower bounds) as the fusion generates overlapping
intervals (Fig. 1).
The overall risk of incurring at least 5 casualties is anywhere between 60% and 80%, while the risk of observing at most 5 casualties
is estimated to be at least 19% and at most 40%. Similarly, the overall risk of incurring at least 1 casualty could be as high as 100%
while the probability of no casualty is at most 40% (not shown in
Table). Therefore, with this new metric, two questions to be asked
could be ‘‘Is the maximum probability of incurring no casualty too
low?” or ‘‘Is the minimum probability of incurring at least 5 casualties too high?” Only with the proposed metric can such questions
be answered.
Since the independent combination of the hazards’ estimates is
actually a special case of fusion (one in which the hazards’ estimates are considered independent of each other), its estimates will
always fall between the two fusion bounds. And by providing a single value for the risk, both the individual hazards estimates and the
estimate obtained from the assumption of independence will always be either pessimistic or optimistic estimates of the true risk.
For example, while MinRISK (EC 6 ECTRESH = 1) is as low as 0%, the
independent fusion predicts this risk to be around 22%. The debris
on the other hand predicts that the risk is more than 99%. Both the
independent and the debris cases provide estimates which can
4
High overpressure blasts were found to reach the ground only for breakup that
occur less than 15 s after launch.
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Fig. 4. Oklahoma CCDs and population distribution, and overlapping debris ﬁelds, along the vehicle trajectory. A probability distribution of the expectation of number of
casualties from a debris standpoint can be derived.

Fig. 5. Non-congruent areas at risk around Clinton-Sherman airport as estimated by the three hazards (population layer removed for clarity, actual spaceport location is
inside blast waves).

clearly be considered optimistic, as they negate the real possibility
of incurring at least one 1 casualty.
5.2. Assessing the geographic distribution of the overall risk
As mentioned earlier, strong consideration should be given to
assessing how the overall risk is distributed among the geographic

entities. The cumulative hazard impact areas as shown in Fig. 5 can
be used along with population information to generate, for each
CCD impacted, casualty distributions similar to those of Tables 4
and 5 and results similar to Table 6. However, as the interest is
on the geographic distribution of the overall risk, it is more practical and intuitive to generate maps that visually represent that
distribution.
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Table 4
Probability distribution of debris casualties.
Gas casualties
ECD

Blast casualties
Probability

P

<

0
1
...
...
1100

1
10
...
...
1300

Table 6
Events: observing at least and at most 5 casualties.

0.22727
0.17045
...
...
0.06818

ECD

Estimator

Estimate

Fusion lower bound
Fusion upper bound
Independent
Debris
Gas
Blast

MinRISK
MaxRISK
prob(EC  ECTRESH)

Probability

P

<

0
1
10

1
10
20

0.96591
0.01136
0.02273

ECTRESH
At least

At most

0.602
0.807
0.611
0.000
0.773
0.034

0.193
0.398
0.389
1.000
0.227
0.966

 = {> if ‘‘at least” and 6 if ‘‘at most”}.

Table 5
Probability distribution of debris casualties.
ECD

Probability

P

<

0
1
...
8
9

1
2
...
9
–

9.9367E  01
6.1619E  03
...
1.1227E  15
0.0000E + 00

For example, suppose the interest is in detecting those areas
where the probability of observing less than 3 casualties is more
than 95%. In other words, if it was previously determined that
the expectation of casualty threshold should be 3 casualties then
the interest is in identifying those areas that can be deemed safe.
The answer is shown in Fig. 6, with the CCDs highlighted being
those that satisfy the above condition. To generate this map, the

lower bound (MinRISK) of the fusion was used. Alternatively, if the
interest is in identifying those areas where the probability of
observing more than 3 casualties is at least 10%, Fig. 7 will be generated. To generate this map, the upper bound (MaxRISK) of the fusion was used.

6. Additional discussion
Despite the virtues illustrated in this paper of a fusion-based
metric, a more robust statistical comparative analysis is necessary
to establish its apparent superiority over EC. The analysis could involve using Clinton-Sherman Spaceport to compare (1) each individual hazard estimate or (2) the independent combination of
the hazards’ estimates with one of the bounds (upper or lower)
of the fusion estimates. Which bound would be used for a speciﬁc
comparison would depend on the objective of the analysis. Additionally, such analysis would also serve to identify the boundaries

Fig. 6. Geographic distribution of prob (EC 6 3) P 0.95.

Fig. 7. Geographic distribution of prob (EC > 3) P 0.1.
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– if any – within which this superiority remains statistically significant, thereby providing valuable insight on the domain over which
use of the information-fusion-based metric should be considered
critical. The details of the analysis however, given its length and
complexity, will be discussed in a future article.
7. Conclusion
Space launch risk safety is a very complex endeavor; one deﬁned by intricate interactions between man, system and machine.
In this paper, a review of the state of art in space launch safety was
provided. The issues related to the mean collective risk to the general public as a safety metric were exposed, as they promote a risk
avoidance rather than risk management philosophy to safety. A
new, information-fusion-based metric, one that focuses on the
probability of exceeding (or not exceeding) a pre-speciﬁed expected casualty threshold, was proposed. A detailed case study
was presented to illustrate its derivation, and its merits in terms
of the quantity and quality of information it generates. Although
some assumptions were made in the case study, such as the independence of the probability of failure of the launch vehicle from
the phase of ﬂight, or the use of a vehicle as large as the Space
Shuttle from an inland spaceport, the study clearly demonstrated
the virtues of a fusion-based metric over the traditional expectation of casualties. Additionally, since the new metric uses EC distributions, its appeal is further enhanced, as it can be easily and
quickly adopted, thereby providing a signiﬁcant ﬁrst step toward
improving space launch risk safety.
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